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Introduction
In this paper we investigate the pass-through from banks' funding costs to their retail rates. We do so by estimating an econometric model using quarterly microdata on individual Norwegian banks from 2001Q2 to 2010Q3. Our focus is on the transmission mechanism from changes in the level and volatility of market interest rates to deposit and lending rates. Traditionally this issue has been examined either by employing time series econometrics on aggregate bank interest rate data (e.g., Chong, 2010; Hofman and Mizen, 2004) or panel data methods on individual banks' interest rates (e.g., Hannan and Berger, 1991; De Graeve et al., 2007) . In contrast,
we consider the retail rates of various banks (or bank groups) as jointly dependent within a large system of equations.
There is related empirical literature on interest rate margins using banks' net interest income relative to total assets as the main dependent variable, either at the aggregate level (for a representative bank) (e.g., Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; Andersen et al., 2008) or, more rarely, at the bank level (e.g., Maudos, 2004) . These approaches su¤er from the weakness that the dependent variable is a mixture of price (interest rate) and volume e¤ects. Hence, it is not straightforward to infer anything from these studies concerning responses of banks'interest rates or interest margins to changes in exogenous variables, because di¤erent e¤ects are entangled.
We employ a detailed panel data set with quarterly accounts data on all Norwegian banks from 2001Q2 until 2010Q3. In the data, volumes and interest rates over a quarter are speci…ed for various types of deposits and loans, according to sector (such as households or non…nancial …rms) and type of loan (mortgage, other loans).
Microdata allow us to study heterogeneity between banks, for example, whether the interest margins of di¤erent banks react di¤erently to exogenous shocks. Moreover, we are able to analyze di¤erences in interest margins between loans to businesses and households, and in the speed of adjustment of banks'interest rates to changes in exogenous variables. The bank-speci…c dynamics in retail rates (in this paper de…ned as all interest rates on deposits and loans set by the bank) implies that estimates of long-run coe¢ cients will be biased, even if the primary interest is in the parameters of the long-run relation between retail rates and funding costs of an average or "representative" bank (cf. Pesaran and Smith, 1995) . This paper addresses this problem by estimating a ‡exible model with heterogeneous, bankspeci…c parameters from microdata and aggregating these with equations speci…c to each individual bank (or bank groups; see Section 3) to obtain the corresponding empirical relation for a representative bank.
We focus on (i) loans to households, (ii) loans to corporations in the non…nan-cial sector and (iii) households'bank deposits. The corresponding interest rates are collected from all banks (or bank groups), placed in a high-dimensional system of equations and analyzed within the framework of dynamic factor modeling. This framework allows us to consider interdependence between retail rates and banks within one system of equations, while avoiding the "curse of dimensionality" associated with high-dimensional vector autoregressive (VAR) models. In accordance with most empirical literature on interest margins (e.g., Saunders and Schumacher, 2000) , our model includes an interbank market rate, i.e., the three-month Norwegian Inter Bank O¤ered Rate (NIBOR), as an explanatory variable.
More speci…cally, we formulate and test particular hypotheses about the e¤ects of changes in market rates on banks' retail rates, both in the short run and in a steady state. In particular, we consider three types of interest margins at the bank level: the di¤erence between (i) the household loan rate and the deposit rate, (ii) the corporate loan rate and the deposit rate and (iii) the average net interest margin: the ratio of total funding costs to total loans. The latter is a measure of banks'earnings per unit in total outstanding loan. In a competitive bank market, a permanent change in the marginal cost of wholesale funding should be passed fully over to loan and deposit rates (see Hannan and Berger, 1991) . However, if banks have market power, they are faced with a trade-o¤ between con ‡icting goals: high (low) interest on loans (deposits) on the one hand and high volume on the other. The spread between the price of market funding and retail rates may therefore change as a result of a change in the former; that is, there may be incomplete pass-through in both the long and the short run. The completeness hypothesis is formally tested in our analysis.
A novelty of our approach is that we consider the retail rates of each individual bank (or bank group) as interdependent endogenous variables within a joint system of equations, rather than independent units analyzed by means of panel data methods. The comovements among various banks'retail rates are captured in our approach by common dynamic factors. As a result, we are able to separate the e¤ect on retail rates of common observed variables (such as interbank market rates) from the e¤ect of unobserved common variables (re ‡ecting, for example, changes in bank regulations, competition and productivity). The 10-year period we analyze is particularly interesting because it is characterized by increased competition between banks, as well as productivity growth due to wider use of Internet-based payment services.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main concepts and describes the empirical model, Section 3 presents the data, Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
The modeling framework
Funding costs Banks need to raise funds to provide loans. We organize these funds into two categories: customer deposits and wholesale funding (market funding from private and institutional investors, including other banks). According to lenders, the marginal funding source for loans to households and businesses is wholesale funding. Banks may need to raise a large amount of funding over a short period.
This cannot be done through raising retail deposits by increasing the rates on deposits, because bank customers (households and …rms) typically do not react quickly to changes in interest rates. Wholesale funding is typically bonds, which to varying degrees match the expected maturity of the loans provided. There may be considerable heterogeneity between banks with regard to the extent and composition of market funding (e.g., regarding the maturity of debt). In this paper we interpret the marginal funding cost as that of raising senior unsecured bonds. An unsecured bond may be issued with a …xed or variable interest rate. In the …rst case, a Norwegian bank typically enters into an interest rate swap to achieve a level of variable rate exposure that matches the variable rate loans. The banks'costs may be expressed by two components: the variable rate cash ‡ows paid in the interest rate swap (normally three-month NIBOR) and the …xed cash ‡ow due to the issuer-speci…c credit spread over the swap rate 1 . In this paper we include both the three-month NIBOR and the spread of unsecured senior bonds issued by Norwegian banks as measures of the cost of market funding. Our explanatory variables represent the exogenous funding costs of banks and the associated risk. The main variable is the three-month NIBOR rate, r t , which is a key determinant of external funding costs, as explained above. For the individual banks, it is reasonable to assume that r t is exogenous; that is, the individual bank cannot in ‡uence NIBOR through its supply and demand for credit in the interbank market. The rationale behind this assumption is that (major) banks can borrow and lend NOK through the foreign exchange rate markets such as the NOK-USD exchange swap market. Covered interest rate parity implies that the NIBOR rate is determined by international lending and swap exchange rates, which are exogenous to individual Norwegian banks 3 .
We also include the volatility of r t , t , as an explanatory variable. This variable is a proxy for interest rate risk, as described by Ho and Saunders (1981) . In the Ho and Saunders model, banks …nance the di¤erence between the demand for loans and the supply of deposits by wholesale funding. If banks are risk averse, the interest margin between the loan rate and the deposit rate will be increasing in the volatility of the market rate 4 .
In our empirical implementation, r t and squared volatility, 2 t , are calculated quarterly, as weighted averages of daily interest rates and daily squared interest rate deviations from the mean, with geometrically decaying weights. Formally, let r t;j , j = 1; :::; M t denote the NIBOR rate of day j in quarter t, where M t is the number of trading days in quarter t. Then
To measure 2 t , we calculate the weighted mean of the squared deviations (r t;j r t ) 2 :
where e k t = P Mt 1 j=0 j . In our application we use = 0:9 and = 0:5, which means that the weight attached to the …rst observation in the quarter relative to the latest observation is about 10 percent for r t , whereas only the latest 4-5 observations have nonnegligible weight when 2 t is calculated. These parameter values approximately maximize the in-sample …t of the model when a grid search is conducted over possible -and -values. We also include the spread of senior unsecured bonds, denoted by s t , to examine the e¤ect of changes in the credit spread on the banks'retail rates.
Our econometric model speci…es a stochastic relation between the retail rates (r
it ; ) and the exogenous variables (r t ; t ; s t ) for each bank. It accommodates the following important features:
asymmetries in the relation between the retail rates and r t , depending on the sign of r t = r t r t 1 ; ‡exible short-term dynamics, where di¤erent r X it , X = D; H; B, are allowed to react di¤erently to exogenous shocks; bank-speci…c parameters; stochastic shocks that are common across di¤erent banks (i) and type of interest rate (X);
stochastic shocks speci…c to a particular bank and interest rate.
Conditional on the common explanatory variables, we model the individual retail rates as univariate autoregressive processes, augmented with common dynamic factors to account for joint dependencies. The use of common dynamic factors is a parsimonious way of capturing the comovements among variables. In contrast, the number of parameters in VAR models increases exponentially with the number of equations. Examples of dynamic factors are the so-called di¤usion index models (see Forni et al., 2000, and Stock and Watson, 2002) and the factor-augmented VAR model, FAVAR (see Bernanke et al., 2005) . However, our approach has more in common with the tradition of multivariate structural time series models than with the approximate dynamic factor models most commonly favored in the literature 5 .
In our most general speci…cation we assume that, for X = D; H; B; i = 1; ::; N ;
and t = 1; :::; T :
where X i is a bank-and interest rate-speci…c …xed e¤ect, the -parameters capture the e¤ects of the NIBOR rate by allowing both the current NIBOR rate, r t (through X i;0 ), and the lagged NIBOR rate, r t 1 (through X i;1 ), to a¤ect the current interest rate on loans (X = H; B) and deposits (X = D). One lag is allowed in order to capture the e¤ect of noti…cation rules that restrict the speed at which banks are allowed to increase their loan rates. Moreover, asymmetries in the e¤ects of positive and negative changes are captured by the term How the e¤ects of a shock in the explanatory variables evolve over time depends on the autoregressive parameters X ij , j = 1; :::; p i : The number of lags, p i , is allowed to di¤er from bank to bank. In practice, we …nd that p i = 2 is adequate in most of the equations using the Akaike information criterion (see below). Finally, the unobserved stochastic terms consist of m dynamic factors, f kt , k = 1; :::; m, which pick up the dependence across banks due to common, unobserved variables (e.g., e¤ects of the business cycle, credit market regulations and competition) and the idiosyncratic error term e X it , that is, independent across banks (i) and over time with covariance matrix , whereas the dynamic factors, f kt , are assumed to be independent, Gaussian AR(1) processes:
Thus, (f 1t ; ::; f mt ) are latent stochastic processes that capture the comovements between the interest rates of di¤erent banks not accounted for by the observed explanatory variables. The impact of the dynamic factors on the individual banks is determined by bank-speci…c impact coe¢ cients, X ik . In our model the factors play a similar role to that of the "risk factor contributions"in Rosen and Saunders (2010) , in the context of portfolio risk analysis. Our model is estimated by employing a version of the maximum likelihood algorithm described in Raknerud et al. (2010) .
Partial e¤ects Our econometric framework allows us to disentangle partial e¤ects of changes in exogenous variables. In particular, we are interested in the e¤ects of changes in market rates. Let r X i;t+j ( ) denote the causal e¤ect r X i;t+j = r X i;t+j r X i;t+j 1 due to a permanent change in r t from r t 1 = r to r t+j = r + for j 0 (all other variables are assumed to be constant when di¤erencing). Then
The e¤ect of a permanent change, initiated at time t, on r X i;t+h is then given by the cumulative sum P h j=0 r X i;t+j ( ). Moreover, in a steady state where all observed exogenous variables are assumed to be constant over time, r t = r, t = , s t = s, we have
where d t captures the e¤ects of the present and lagged dynamic factors, f js , s t, and "
X it is a moving average of the error terms e X is , s t. Note that the parameters of the weighted average
, where w i is the share of total assets (see Table 1 There is considerable heterogeneity in the funding sources of banks. Small national banks tend to have more deposits than foreign or large national banks, while the latter banks rely more on market funding. For example, at the end of our sample period, Terra Gruppen, which is a group of small banks, has the highest ratio of household deposits over total loans over our sample period: 42 percent. The two foreign bank groups have the lowest ratio-18 percent-while Norway's largest bank, DnB NOR, has a ratio of household deposits over total loans equal to 29 percent. Figure 3 shows the di¤erence in average deposit interest rates between a group of small banks and one of large banks. While the …gure reveals considerable shortterm ‡uctuations, there appears to be no systematic long-term di¤erence between the deposit rates of these two bank groups.
Examining the stationarity of r t To perform statistical tests and assess estimation uncertainty, it is important to assess whether the NIBOR rate is a unit root process or not, because this a¤ects the asymptotic distribution of the maximum likelihood estimator. Taking as a starting point the assumption that r t is not a unit root process, we can test this hypothesis using the test proposed by Choi (1994) in combination with Andrews' (1991) automatic lag truncation procedure, as recommended by Choi and Ahn (1999 
Results
The results presented below are based on a …nal model speci…cation where In equation (5) estimates of steady-state equations for the weighted interest rates-that is, weighted by banks'market shares, w i -are shown. These estimates are obtained by aggregating the individual equations shown in Table 2 . Standard errors in parentheses are obtained by the delta method. We see that for the valueweighted average ("representative") bank, the coe¢ cient of r in the steady state is close to 0:8, and is signi…cantly below one for all three retail rates. Thus the hypothesis of complete pass-through in the long run is clearly rejected. If we examine the bank-speci…c estimates in Table 2 , they are remarkably close to 0:8 across banks and interest rates. A formal test of whether all the steady-state coe¢ cients of r are equal across banks is provided by the Wald tests reported in the last row of Table 2 . We cannot reject the hypothesis of homogeneous long-run parameters.
The corresponding equations for the two interest rate margins between loans and deposits are shown in (6), that is, the di¤erences between the household loan rate and the deposit rates, and between the business loan rate and the deposit rates, respectively. We see that in the steady state, these two interest margins do not depend on r, because both estimates are almost zero.
With regard to the intercept of the steady-state equation, Table 2 shows that the bank-speci…c parameters vary considerably across banks, but also that the estimation uncertainty is considerably larger than for the steady-state coe¢ cients of r. The results from the Wald test show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that banks have the same steady-state intercept with regard to deposits, although we do reject it with regard to both types of loans.
Turning to the credit spread measure, the results in (5) show that there is no signi…cant e¤ect in the steady state of changes in s t on the deposit rates. On the other hand, an increase in the credit spread induces a signi…cant positive pressure on loan rates, especially loans to businesses. Recall that the underlying (short-run) parameters X 0 are common across banks, so we only report common long-run e¤ects.
The estimated e¤ects on the interest rate margins between loans and deposits in (6) indicate that a permanent unit increase in credit spread leads to a long-term increase in these interest rate margins from roughly 0:3 to 0:4. It should be noted, however, that the estimated e¤ects are identi…ed mainly by events immediately before and after the onset of the …nancial crisis in 2008Q3 and must be interpreted with care, as discussed in Section 2. Speci…cally, as seen in Figure 1 , from 2008Q2 we observe a marked fall in deposit margins and an increase in the margins of loans to households (relative to NIBOR). This pattern can be attributed to the sharp fall in the NIBOR rate during this period, which, according to our model estimates, causes an increase (decrease) in the loan (deposit) margins. The NIBOR rate fell, mainly due to a marked reduction in the policy rate. When the policy rate becomes very low, banks' opportunity to lower their deposit rates is limited, and the deposit margin falls.
To compensate for the reduced margins on deposits, the banks may increase their margins on loans. Moreover, banks have a limited ability to quickly adjust the rates on loans because of noti…cation rules, which may contribute to temporary high margins on loans during periods of falling policy rates. s + residual (6) Let us now examine the impact of interest rate volatility, . The bank-speci…c parameter estimates shown in Table 2 reveal a high degree of statistical uncertainty regarding the impact of . Nevertheless, as predicted by economic theory (e.g., Ho and Saunders, 1981) , the aggregate equations (5) show a signi…cant positive relation between t and the endogenous interest rates.
Figures 5 and 6 display the partial predictive power of r and , respectively, when all the other variables in the model (observed and unobserved) are kept constant over time. When the graphs are constructed, all variables except that on the horizontal axis are kept constant at the sample average, whereas the data points are ordered according to the variable on the horizontal axis. Comparing the actual data and the …tted interest curves in Figure 5 , we see that the partial predictive power of r is quite good. On the other hand, using as (the only) explanatory variable results in large prediction errors, as evident in Figure 6 . .000
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The bank groups reported here are not identi…ed by name for con…dentiality reasons. Average of bank-speci…c coe¢ cients weighted by inverse variance. Wald test of the restriction that all parameters are equal (6 d.f.).
The estimated autoregressive parameters, X ij , corresponding to the bank-speci…c retail rates, and the AR(1) coe¢ cients k , corresponding to the three common dynamic factors f kt , are displayed in Table 3 . The number of lags is equal to two in most cases, whereas the number of common factors is equal to three. These choices were made by applying the Akaike information criterion (see Raknerud et al., 2010 , for details regarding model selection in a similar model). All the lag
where L is the lag operator) have roots well outside the unit circle, so the individual retail rates clearly evolve as stationary processes after subtracting the e¤ects of the dynamic factors f kt . However, two of the dynamic factors are estimated to be unit root processes, so the retail series themselves are not stationary but evolve around a common stochastic trend. These common trends detect, among other things, the decrease in average loan-deposit interest margins over time that is evident from Figure 4 . The downward trend in both household and business interest margins over time may occur because of increased competition and increased productivity in the banking sector.
The Wald tests reported in Table 3 reveal that there is signi…cant bank-speci…c heterogeneity in the interest rate dynamics with regard to the …rst-lag parameter, X i1 . On the other hand, the hypothesis that X i2 has a common value across banks could not be rejected for any retail rate. The estimated autoregressive parameters are typically less than 0.2 in absolute value, with X i1 > 0 and X i2 < 0. These estimates suggest that retail rates adjust quickly to exogenous shocks. Table 4 . Almost all of the adjustment is completed by the end of the …rst quarter after the change in NIBOR (quarter 1), and approximately one-third to a half of the full adjustment is conducted in the same quarter (quarter 0). The exception is the deposit rate when NIBOR increases; then, the adjustment in the same quarter is estimated to only approximately one-…fth on average, re ‡ecting some rigidity in deposit rates in the case of a positive shock in the market rate. Table 4 Similarly, when faced with an upward-sloping supply curve for deposits, banks will take into consideration that deposits will decrease when the deposit rate is lowered.
The presence of such e¤ects is con…rmed by our …nding that the coe¢ cients of r in (5) are clearly below one for all retail rates. This is in line with De Graeve et al. (2007), who also analyze microdata, but contrary to most evidence from aggregate bank data (see De Bondt, 2002 , for an overview).
The development in the average net interest margin of a representative bank when the NIBOR rate increases is illustrated in Figure 11 . Here it is assumed that the average price of market funding in the quarter is equal to the three-month NIBOR. This assumption is not entirely realistic. First, the credit spread is ignored.
Second, the average cost of market funding will not follow the NIBOR rate (the hand, to increase its market share a bank needs to rely more on market funding, which makes it more vulnerable to shocks in the market rate. .40
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The bank groups reported here are not identi…ed by name for con…dentiality reasons.
The results for X ij are averages of bank-speci…c coe¢ cients weighted by their inverse variance.
Wald test of the restriction that all banks have equal parameters (6 d.f.). Table 4 : Adjustment speed after a permanent change equal to delta in the NIBOR rate.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Share of total adjustment in same quarter Share of total adjustment after one quarter = 1 .34 (.08 
Conclusion
We have used a dynamic factor model and a detailed panel data set with quarterly accounts data on all Norwegian banks to study how banks' funding costs a¤ect their interest rates. Our estimates reveal that for a representative bank the net interest margin decreases with the level of the market rate, because we …nd clear evidence of incomplete pass-through from the market rate to retail rates. The cost of market funding is estimated by the three-month Norwegian Inter Bank O¤ered Rate (NIBOR).
Our estimates show that a unit increase in NIBOR leads to an approximately 0.8 increase in banks' retail rates (both loan rates and deposit rates) in the long run. Our …ndings are consistent with banks facing a downward-sloping demand curve for loans and an upward-sloping supply curve for customer deposits. While the margin between loan and deposit rates remains unchanged when the NIBOR rate increases, the spread between the loan rate and the NIBOR rate decreases.
Our results indicate that banks balance a positive price e¤ect and a negative e¤ect on the demand for loans when deciding on an increase in lending rates. There is also a signi…cant positive relation between the indicative credit spread of uncovered bonds issued by banks and loan rates, especially regarding loans to businesses. The estimated e¤ects on the interest rate margin between loan and deposit rates indicate that a permanent unit increase in credit spread leads to a long-term increase in the interest rate margins of roughly 0:3 to 0:4.
The econometric relations established in this paper should be useful in a stress test framework, where the interest is typically in how shocks in market rates or policy rates a¤ect banks' lending rates and net interest margins. Another topic, which is currently of great policy importance, is how the e¤ect of tighter capital and liquidity requirements, for example as proposed in the Basel III reform, will a¤ect bank rates (see Angelini et al., 2011) . For example, the reform is expected to increase the average maturity of banks'wholesale funding, which will increase the credit spread relative to NIBOR if the yield curve is increasing. To the extent that the direct impact of these regulatory measures on the (indicative) credit spread can be assessed, our econometric framework can be used directly to estimate the impact of such changes on lending rates and interest margins. The di¤erence between the houshold loan rate and deposit rate after of a unit increase in NIBOR for a representative bank Figure 10 : The di¤erence between business loan rate and deposit rate after of a unit increase in NIBOR for a representative bank Figure 11 : The estimated change in net interest rate margin when increasing NIBOR from 2.6 to 5.2 and 7.8 per cent. Weighted average across bank groups
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